Body & Soul
by J.P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae
- Title: Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics
- Publish Date: 4/2000
- Discount: 27%
- Publisher: InterVarsity Press
- Audience: Advanced, Intermediate
- Kingdom Categories: Life of the Mind
The perspective of Body & Soul continues to be relevant to issues in ethics and philosophical-theological anthropology. Some sort of Christian physicalism continues to be growing among Christian scholars today, despite the fact that some sort of substance dualist view of human persons has been, historically, the reigning view among Christians. Philosophical naturalism continues to dominate educational, intellectual, and policy centers of cultural power. Sure, there have been relevant updates in any of these areas since 2000, which my Consciousness and the Existence of God (Routledge, 2008) and the Recalcitrant Imago Dei (SCM Press, 2009) attempt to address. But we continue to need (if not more so than ever) clear Christian thinking at the intersection of ethics and philosophical-theological anthropology.
Co-authoring Body & Soul with my Biola colleague and good friend of twenty-five years, Scott Rae, was empowering and encouraging. Scott is a first-rate thinker in ethics, especially bioethics and medical ethics. I am deeply grateful for the strength of his expertise and experience in those areas. The book was better because of him. We try to show and model that metaphysics and morality are intimately connected and that our dualist view of the body and soul provides the most compelling account of human personhood and its moral dimension. Frankly, due to the mistaken and erroneous nature of the so-called “fact/value” dichotomy, we need way more work to be done at the intersection of metaphysics and morality. We need further Christian philosophical work that helps to show how the morality or ethics of a view comes from being interconnected with its metaphysics, whether we are talking the views of naturalism or postmodernism or some other outlook.
The book is divided into two parts: part one clarifies and defends our version of substance dualism, and in part two, we analyze and argue for crucial ethical positions that follow from the position maintained in part one.
Part one consists of six chapters. In chapter 1, we analyze several different sorts of dualism and locate our version of Thomistic dualism in this taxonomy. We also argue that a proper understanding of spiritual beings presents a view of persons that is inconsistent with physicalism but that is most reasonably associated with Thomistic dualism. Chapter 2 lays out an appropriate and relevant metaphysical framework for developing an adequate view of human persons and to address various metaphysical issues and concerns. The net result of this chapter is that we try to show how and why it is mistaken to view human persons as property-things instead of as substances. Chapter 3 clarifies the nature of human persons in strict naturalist and complementarian perspectives. Metaphysically speaking, we show that the Christian complementarian understanding is virtually identical to naturalist depictions of human persons on most of the central metaphysical aspects of human personhood. We close this chapter with a brief presentation of the ethical implications of a Christian complementarian anthropology for certain end-of-life ethical issues, which get further developed in part two.
Chapters 4 and 5 argue that human persons are identical to immaterial substances, namely, to souls. Chapter 6 explains the soul’s relationship to the development and functioning of its body. However, in chapters four and five we limit our investigation of human persons to those considerations that support the claim that human persons are essentially immaterial substances. We direct our attention to three important areas: human agency and freedom (chapter four); the nature of our conscious, mental lives and what this tells us about the types of things we are (chapter five); a set of critical considerations about personal identity (chapter five). Chapter 6 develops a view of the soul’s relationship to the body. It is here that we especially part company with Cartesian dualism and advocate Thomistic dualism as both of those are frequently understood.
Part two of the book takes the metaphysical conclusions and applies them to the complex world of bioethics and biotechnology. Not surprising, many of the most pressing and complicated issues faced by those in academic medicine and by professional bioethicists have a view of personhood at their core. Moreover, those making moral decisions and public policy in bioethics assume a particular view of a human person.
Chapter 7 addresses the ongoing debate over abortion and the equally important, though less publicized, discussion of fetal-tissue research and transplantation. Among other things, given our Thomistic substance view of personal identity, we argue that the use of fetal tissue from induced abortion is morally tainted since the means of obtaining the tissue has a moral dimension, as does the end for which the tissue is used. These are not amoral concerns. Chapter 8 discusses the moral status of extracorporeal embryos, particularly those that are created through in vitro fertilization and kept in storage laboratories. We argue that these embryos are persons with moral status, and as such, they should not be discarded or used for experiments after infertility treatments are complete and, similarly, that they should not be created in the lab for purposes of research.
Chapter 9 considers the “brave new world” of genetic technologies and human cloning. Foundational to this discussion is the view that the essence of a human person can be reduced to or taken as emergent upon his or her genetic content. We take to task genetic reductionism and argue that a person is much more than one’s genetic material. Lastly, we suggest that human cloning does not involve creating souless persons and the concept itself is an oxymoron.
Chapter 10 addresses end-of-life issues, such as euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide and the treatment of patients in a persistent vegetative state. We reject euthanasia. But the more difficult area is the moral status of persons in a vegetate state. We maintain that they are still persons, but that further treatment of them, including medically provided nutrition and hydration, is futile and thus is not a moral obligation.
Increasingly, we need ethical/bioethical reflection that is worthy of the value and dignity of human persons; specifically, Christians need to seriously reflect upon the biblical teaching about the soul’s reality and nature. Any philosophical and theological thinking about human persons must be tested in light of what sort of ethical reflection and implication it provides. We can’t afford to divorce our metaphysics of human persons from our ethics of human persons.
Related Content: If Body & Soul interests you, you might also want to consider the following:
- "Infanticide: Issues and Options" (article)
- Beyond Death (book)
- Philosophy Made Slightly Less Difficult (book)
- Naturalism (book)
- Philosophical Foundations For A Christian Worldview (book)
- Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (book)
- Consciousness and the Existence of God (book)
- The Recalcitrant Imago Dei (book)
- Scaling the Secular City (book)
- Christian Perspectives on Being Human (book)
- Preview This Book
- Order Body & Soul
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