Restoring the Substance to the Soul of Psychology
by J.P. Moreland
- Title: Restoring the Substance to the Soul of Psychology
- Date: 1998
- Source: Journal of Psychology and Theology 26:1 (1998): 29-43.
- Article Type: Journal Article
- Audience: Advanced, Intermediate
- Kingdom Categories: Life of the Mind
Currently in the literature (if not also in clinical practice), talk and thinking about the self has replaced the soul as the major focus of much psychological theorizing.
I argue that this shift is due to a number of confusions regarding the nature and justification of substance dualism. I also claim that this focus on the self, without a framework that treats it as a substantial soul, leads to a number of conceptual problems and terminological equivocations. Moreover, I show that certain features of widely accepted views of the self actually seem to require a substantial soul to make sense.
To substantiate these claims, Section I contains a discussion of a set of current misunderstandings about the nature of a substance (e.g., that a substance is a static thing unrelated to other things), and a treatment of key problems with current models of the self (e.g., that the self is a construct of language). Section II compares two very different views of wholes with parts-substances vs. property-things. Section III clarifies the essence of substance dualism by describing five states of the soul and the nature of a faculty of the soul. The section closes with a sketch of the main types of considerations that justify belief in substance dualism. In the final section, I argue that the self is the soul by showing how key features of certain psychological models of the self seem to require substance dualism to make sense and by clarifying a set of psychological terms/concepts in light of what has been argued earlier.
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focus of much psychological theorizing. I argue that
this shift is due to a number of confusions regarding
the nature and justification of substance dualism. I
also claim that this focus on the self, without a framework
that treats it as a substantial soul, leads to a
number of conceptual problems and terminological
equivocations. Moreover, I show that certain features
of widely accepted views of the self actually seem to
require a substantial soul to make sense. To substantiate
these claims, Section I contains a discussion of a set
of current misunderstandings about the nature of a
substance (e.g., that a substance is a static thing unrelated
to other things), and a treatment of key problems
with current models of the self (e.g., that the self is a
construct of language). Section II compares two very
different views of wholes with parts-substances vs.
property-things. Section III clarifies the essence of substance
dualism by describing five states of the soul and
the nature of a faculty of the soul. The section closes
with a sketch of the main types of considerations that
justify belief in substance dualism. In the final section,
I argue that the self is the soul by showing how key
features of certain psychological models of the self
seem to require substance dualism to make sense and
by clarifying a set of psychological terms/concepts in
light of what has been argued earlier.Currently, the self has replaced the soul as the major
focus of much psychological theorizing. I argue that
this shift is due to a number of confusions regarding
the nature and justification of substance dualism. I
also claim that this focus on the self, without a framework
that treats it as a substantial soul, leads to a
number of conceptual problems and terminological
equivocations. Moreover, I show that certain features
of widely accepted views of the self actually seem to
require a substantial soul to make sense. To substantiate
these claims, Section I contains a discussion of a set
of current misunderstandings about the nature of a
substance (e.g., that a substance is a static thing unrelated
to other things), and a treatment of key problems
with current models of the self (e.g., that the self is a
construct of language). Section II compares two very
different views of wholes with parts-substances vs.
property-things. Section III clarifies the essence of substance
dualism by describing five states of the soul and
the nature of a faculty of the soul. The section closes
with a sketch of the main types of considerations that
justify belief in substance dualism. In the final section,
I argue that the self is the soul by showing how key
features of certain psychological models of the self
seem to require substance dualism to make sense and
by clarifying a set of psychological terms/concepts in
light of what has been argued earlier.
Benefits:
- It examines and argues for the importance of thinking about how substances are an indispensable metaphysical category for psychology and philosophy of mind considerations.
- It contributes to the philosophical, theological and psychological discussions on substance dualism.
- It offers a handy introduction to a robust Christian philosophical anthropology.
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